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FAILED PROTECTORS: THE INDIAN TRUST
AND KILLERS OF THE FLOWER MOON
Matthew L .M . Fletcher*
KILLERS OF THE FLOWER MOON: THE OSAGE MURDERS AND THE
BIRTH OF THE FBI. By David Grann. New York: Doubleday. 2017.
P. 291. Cloth, $28.95; paper, $16.95.
INTRODUCTION
David Grann’s Killers of the Flower Moon: The Osage Murders and the
Birth of the FBI1 details a story that is widely known in Indian country2 but
that has never before penetrated mainstream American culture:3 the mass-
murder conspiracy that haunted the Osage Indian Nation in the 1920s and
that was known by newspapers at the time as the Osage Reign of Terror.4
* Professor of Law & Director of the Indigenous Law and Policy Center, Michigan
State University College of Law. Thanks to Kristen Carpenter, Kate Fort, Cathi Grosso, Myri-
am Jaïdi, Wilson Pipestem, Angela Riley, Neoshia Roemer, Wenona Singel, Alex Skibine, and
to the participants at a Michigan State University College of Law faculty workshop.
1. David Grann is a staff writer, The New Yorker.
2. Grann’s book is far from the first book to address these events. Chickasaw novelist
Linda Hogan’s first book, Mean Spirit (1990), is a fictionalized account and was nominated for
a Pulitzer Prize in 1991. Finalist, Mean Spirit, by Linda Hogan (Atheneum), PULITZER PRIZES,
http://www.pulitzer.org/finalists/linda-hogan [https://perma.cc/55LN-8SVM]. Osage writer
Dennis McAuliffe, Jr.’s Bloodland: A Family Story of Oil, Greed and Murder on the Osage Res-
ervation (1994) is a fact-based account focused on the writer’s family members that suffered
through these events. There are other accounts as well. See LAWRENCE J. HOGAN, THE OSAGE
INDIAN MURDERS: THE TRUE STORY OF A MULTIPLE MURDER PLOT TO ACQUIRE THE ESTATES
OF WEALTHY OSAGE TRIBE MEMBERS (1998); LONNIE E. UNDERHILL, THE OSAGE INDIAN
REIGN OF TERROR: THE VIOLENCE OF BILL HALE, 1921–1923 (2010); see also DONALD L.
FIXICO, THE INVASION OF INDIAN COUNTRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AMERICAN
CAPITALISM AND TRIBAL NATURAL RESOURCES 27–53 (2d ed. 2012); Rennard Strickland,
Osage Oil: Mineral Law, Murder, Mayhem, and Manipulation, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T,
Summer 1995, at 39; Molly Stephey, The Osage Murders: Oil Wealth, Betrayal and the FBI’s
First Big Case, NAT’L MUSEUM AM. INDIAN (Mar. 1, 2011), http://blog.nmai.si.edu/main/2011/
03/the-osage-murders-oil-wealth-betrayal-and-the-fbis-first-big-case.html [https://perma.cc/
9NU3-F495].
3. Grann’s book may soon become a film. See Nick Vivarelli, Leonardo DiCaprio, Mar-
tin Scorsese Teaming Up Again for New Movie, VARIETY (July 14, 2017, 8:34 AM),
http://variety.com/2017/film/news/martin-scorsese-development-killers-of-the-flower-moon-
dante-ferretti-1202495680/ [https://perma.cc/68SJ-SJYX].
4 . E .g ., Courts End Osage Indian ‘Reign of Terror’: Murder and Sudden Death Have
Broken Tribal Peace Since Oil Was Discovered on Oklahoma Reservation—White Men Indicted
for Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1926, at 4, https://www.nytimes.com/1926/
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Grann’s tale focuses on the family of Mollie Burkhart—including her moth-
er, Lizzie Q. Kyle, and her sisters—all of whom were murdered except Mol-
lie. Shedding light on a series of American tragedies is admirable, but
Grann’s focus on the Osage murder investigation as the “Birth of the FBI” is
a sad joke. All along, it was the United States that held the threads of the lives
of the Osage people. In a very real sense, it was the United States that was the
criminal mastermind.
Worse, while Killers of the Flower Moon is a story of the federal govern-
ment’s broken promises to Indian people and Indian nations, a horrific part
of American history, that story is not over. The conditions that the United
States implemented that led to the Osage Reign of Terror remain in place in
twenty-first-century Indian country. Law and order in Indian country in the
twenty-first century is broken. Each year, thousands of women and children
are victims of violent crime,5 perhaps the greatest omission in Killers of the
Flower Moon.
Broadly speaking, the federal government is the primary reason Osage
people suffered and continue to suffer these outrages. The United States’ en-
croachment on the Osage Nation’s traditional homelands in what is now
Missouri and Arkansas forced the tribe to undergo a series of migrations that
ultimately placed the Osage Nation in Oklahoma.6 The United States created
the conditions that allowed local business interests and law enforcement to
conspire to murder dozens of Osage people—and steal from many more—
for years without consequence. The United States’ limited response to these
murders was too late and far too incomplete. All these failings derived from
the government’s failure to fulfill the federal–tribal trust relationship, the
modern label for the historic legal obligation called the duty of protection.
This Review uses Killers of the Flower Moon as a starting point to high-
light how Indian people in Indian country continue to be subjected to high
crime rates. And yet, however horrible the Osage Reign of Terror was, the
reality for too many Indian people today is much worse. This Review shows
how policy choices made by all three branches of the federal government
have failed indigenous people. Part I establishes the federal–tribal trust rela-
tionship that originated with a duty of protection. Part II explains how the
United States’ failure to fulfill its duties to the Osage Nation and its citizens
01/17/archives/courts-end-osage-indian-reign-of-terror-murder-and-sudden-death.html (on
file with the Michigan Law Review); Hale Found Guilty of Osage Murder: Alleged Inciter of
“Reign of Terror” Among Tribe Is Sentenced to Prison for Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1929, at 20,
https://www.nytimes.com/1929/01/27/archives/hale-found-guilty-of-osage-murder-alleged-
inciter-of-reign-of.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
5 . See Timothy Williams, Higher Crime, Fewer Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-higher-
crime-and-fewer-prosecutions.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
6 . See Alysa Landry, Native History: Osage Forced to Abandon Lands in Missouri and
Arkansas, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 10, 2013), https://indiancountry
medianetwork.com/history/events/native-history-osage-forced-to-abandon-lands-in-
missouri-and-arkansas/ [https://perma.cc/773G-2J9Z].
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allowed, and even indirectly encouraged, the Osage Reign of Terror. Part III
offers thoughts on the future of the trust relationship in light of the rise of
tribal self-determination. This Review concludes with a warning about how
modern crime rates against indigenous women and children are outrageous-
ly high in large part because of the continuing failures of the United States.
I. PROTECTION
Long ago, the United States undertook a legal obligation to Indian peo-
ple and tribal nations called the “duty of protection.”7 Killers of the Flower
Moon offers merely one example of how the federal government failed to
meet that duty. This Part details the origins and scope of the federal govern-
ment’s duties to Indian people generally and to the people of the Osage Na-
tion specifically.
The federal government established the Osage reservation in 1872
through the Osage Act.8 In 1906, the Osage Allotment Act severed the sur-
face estate and mineral estate, resulting in the unusual circumstance in
which the owners of the land on the surface do not own the minerals or oth-
er resources below.9 The Act authorized the allotment of the Osage reserva-
tion, which transferred much of that land in fee to tribal members.10 But the
Osage Nation’s ownership of the reservation’s severed mineral estate was
preserved—to be held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the
tribe.11 Oil and gas is plentiful on those lands (pp. 53–55). Each of the 2,229
Osage people at that time owned an equal, undivided interest in the mineral
estate (p. 243).
Eventually Osage citizens became wealthy, as wealthy as anyone on the
planet, in Grann’s telling of the story (p. 6). Historian Donald Fixico claims
that companies paid at least $240 million in royalties to Osage people during
this period,12 a figure that surely would be in the billions in today’s dollars.13
The tragedy of Killers of the Flower Moon is that newly wealthy Osage Indi-
ans began to disappear or die under mysterious circumstances, seemingly
murdered one by one (pp. 5–16, 31, 36, 67–69). Local law enforcement
7 . See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“From their very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them
and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power.” (emphasis added)); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556 (1832) (“This
treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national character of the Cherokees, and their right of
self government; thus guarantying their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of course
pledging the faith of the United States for that protection; has been frequently renewed, and is
now in full force.” (emphasis added)).
8. Act of June 5, 1872, ch. 310, 17 Stat. 228.
9. Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539.
10. Pp. 49–53; United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2017).
11. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1120–21 (10th Cir. 2010).
12. FIXICO, supra note 2, at 48.
13. Rennard Strickland reported that by the 1970s, Osage people had collected over
$500 million in royalties. Strickland, supra note 2, at 39.
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found no leads and initially prosecuted no one; the Oklahoma Attorney
General charged the local sheriff with willfully refusing to enforce the law
(p. 56). Local people, some of whom later would be convicted of murder,
hired private investigators with Osage money (pp. 56–65). The Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI), only recently formed, intervened (pp. 103–12).
Grann tells the story of how non-Osage persons in Osage County thwarted
local prosecutions, forcing the FBI to intervene in one of its first high-profile
cases (pp. 92–96). Along the way, apparently due to the lack of cooperation
from the locals, the FBI embraced modern law enforcement investigative
work, which led to the prosecution of several non-Osage persons for the
murder of several indigenous people (Chapters Nine to Thirteen, Nineteen).
Grann is not a lawyer, so it is worth describing the legal environment in
which the circumstances described in Killers of the Flower Moon arise. The
foundation of federal Indian law is the legal relationship between the United
States and federally recognized Indian tribes.14 That relationship has gone
through several shifts over the course of American history. For the past half
century or so, the law primarily refers to that arrangement as a trust relation-
ship.15 For a century or more before that, the law generally referred to that
relationship as a guardianship, with the federal government as teacher and
protector and Indian people as the government’s wards.16 But these are
merely metaphors. The relationship is best characterized as a duty of protec-
tion, which is how the United States and Indian nations first described the
relationship in the earliest treaties and federal laws.17 The duty of protection
undertaken by the United States in relation to Indian nations in the early
decades of the American Republic was not unheard of in international law,
where it was recognized that superior sovereigns could take weaker sover-
eigns under their protection.18
In the earliest federal Indian law decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, during the tenure of Chief Justice Marshall, the Court confirmed the
duty of protection the United States owed to Indian nations. The Court re-
ferred to Indian nations as “domestic dependent nations” and “distinct, in-
dependent political communities,” confirming tribal nations’ status as do-
14. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.2, at 175 (2016).
15 . E .g ., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973) (“There is no doubt that the
United States serves in a fiduciary capacity with respect to these Indians and that, as such, it is
duty bound to exercise great care in administering its trust.”).
16. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5.2, at 178–81; Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear & Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, “We Need Protection From Our Protectors”: The Nature, Issues, and Future of the Fed-
eral Trust Responsibility to Indians, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 397, 408 (2017).
17 . E .g ., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“Meanwhile they are
in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardi-
an. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to
it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.” (emphasis added)).
18. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832) (“This relation was that of a
nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of individuals
abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master.”).
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mestic, sovereign entities.19 As domestic sovereigns, Indian tribes have the
legal capacity under American constitutional law to negotiate and execute
treaties with the United States.20 Those Indian treaties and the relevant acts
of Congress define, implement, and confirm the federal government’s con-
tinuing duty of protection to Indian nations.21 The treaties memorialized
federal government obligations to Indian nations that Indian treaty negotia-
tors bargained for; those obligations continue to this day as federal law under
the Supremacy Clause absent a clear statement of intent from either party to
abrogate them.22 The Supreme Court later recognized that the United States
additionally owed a moral obligation to Indian nations deriving from the du-
ty of protection and the course of dealings between the federal government
and indigenous people, dealings that tended to involve the betrayal, in one
form or another, of the duty of protection.23
Call it a trust, a guardianship, or a duty of protection, but as a matter of
law, the federal government’s bargained-for legal relationship with Indian
nations and Indian people is a significant source of authority for federal laws
even today—along with the Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power, and
perhaps other sources.24 Consider any federal law or government program in
Indian affairs. Each law and program can be traced to the duty of protection
originating in Indian treaties. Numerous Indian treaties reference housing,
health care, education, job training, law enforcement, support for tribal
economies, protection of lands, and military protection. Each of these prom-
ises by the United States to Indian nations serves as a source of authority for
the work of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Indian Health Service, and eve-
ry other federal office that does Indian affairs work. But more fundamental-
ly, the duty of protection accepted by the United States is the source of the
power to perform this work.
Indian treaties also established bargained-for property rights, typically
called treaty rights in modern parlance.25 These rights can include the right
to hunt, fish, gather, and farm on and off Indian lands without interfer-
ence.26 These rights can include the right of exclusivity to land and exclusivi-
19 . Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 (“They may, more correctly, perhaps, be de-
nominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title in-
dependent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of pos-
session ceases.”); Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 (“The Indian nations had always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial . . . .”).
20. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5.3, at 212–14.
21 . Id . § 5.2, at 177–78 (collecting treaties acknowledging duty of protection).
22 . Id . § 5.7, at 228.
23. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
24. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5.2, at 181–94 (collecting statutes enacted based on im-
plementing the general trust responsibility).
25 . See generally id . § 3.7.
26 . See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY
§§ 1:2–:4, at 20–121 (2005).
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ty of government. Treaties specific to one or more tribes might even go fur-
ther and protect individual Indians’ right to travel27 or an Indian tribe’s right
to be free from federal regulations.28 The federal government, as a party to
Indian treaties and their bargained-for content, has an obligation to protect
those treaty rights.
The federal government’s intervention in the Osage killings was no mere
story of the FBI swooping in to save discreet minorities from corrupt local
government. There is no bank robbery or kidnapping, no drug trafficking or
international terrorism, no Russian or Chinese interference in American
elections. The federal government’s obligation then (and now) was to ensure
safety in Indian country, but to say the Department of Justice placed (or now
places) much of a priority on Indian country crime is simply wrong. Conse-
quently, the Osage people pay a terrible price.
II. BETRAYAL
Killers of the Flower Moon grippingly details the story of the methodical
killing of Mollie Burkhart’s entire family by her husband, his relatives, and
his business partners. The FBI and the federal government, in Grann’s tell-
ing, swoop in with law enforcement and prosecutorial power.29 They effec-
tively stop the killing of Mollie and her remaining child. But the real story is
not how Mollie is saved but how the federal government failed the Osage
murder victims before her. The federal government’s betrayal of the Osage
Nation and its citizens was deep, varied, and systematic.
The federal government has owed a duty of protection to the Osage Na-
tion for over two hundred years. The Osage Nation is a party to numerous
treaties with the United States, beginning in the 1800s.30 The historic Osage
Nation, a group of villages including the four Great Osage villages and the
Little Osage village, ceded what is now the State of Missouri, the northern
half of Arkansas, and large parts of Kansas and Oklahoma in the earliest
treaties with the United States.31 With the final cession by treaty, the Osage
Nation and the federal government established a reservation for the tribe in
27 . E .g ., Cree v. Flores, 157 F.3d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1998).
28 . See, e .g ., Chickasaw Nation, 362 N.L.R.B. 109 (2015).
29 . See chapters 17–18.
30 . See, e .g ., Treaty with the Great and Little Osages, Sept. 29, 1865, 14 Stat. 687; Treaty
with the Great and Little Osages, Jan. 11, 1839, 7 Stat. 576; Treaty with the Kiowas, Ka-ta-kas,
and Ta-wa-ka-ros Indians, May 26, 1837, 7 Stat. 533; Convention with the Commanches and
Witchetaws, Aug. 24, 1835, 7 Stat. 474; Treaty with the Great and Little Osages, Aug. 10, 1825,
7 Stat. 268; Treaty with the Great and Little Osages, June 2, 1825, 7 Stat. 240; Treaty with the
Great and Little Osages, Aug. 31, 1822, 7 Stat. 222; Treaty with the Great and Little Osages,
Sept. 25, 1818, 7 Stat. 183; Treaty with the Osages, Sept. 12, 1815, 7 Stat. 133; Treaty with the
Great and Little Osages, Nov. 10, 1808, 7 Stat. 107. These treaties are collected in Logan v. An-
drus, 457 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 n.6 (N.D. Okla. 1978).
31. FIXICO, supra note 2, at 28; Geoffrey M. Standing Bear, Can the Host Survive Re-
moval of the Parasite?, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 809 (2000).
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Kansas in 1825.32 That lasted until 1871, when the United States terminated
the reservation and forced the Osage Nation to Oklahoma; there, the federal
government—using Osage trust funds acquired from the sale of their Kansas
lands—had purchased land from the Cherokee Nation,33 itself a victim of
removal (pp. 40–41). Initially, Oklahoma was a disaster for the Osage people;
starvation and disease reduced the Osage population from 3,679 to about
1,000 in just a few years.34 All the buffalo were gone (p. 42). The federal gov-
ernment refused to pay treaty annuities to the Osages until they took up
farming, which was nearly impossible given the difficult terrain of the Okla-
homa reservation (p. 42). The tribe established a constitutional system of
government in 1881, only to have the federal government terminate that
government in 1900.35 Oil began flowing in 1897, likely encouraging the fed-
eral government to assume more control over the reservation lands and the
American Indians living there.36 The government enacted an allotment plan
in 1906 and severed the mineral estate.37 The government also created a trib-
al membership roll that established a headright system: an interest in the
mineral estate akin to a share in a corporation.38 Under this system, only
headright winners could vote in tribal elections.39 If Osage people did not
acquire a headright before 1908, they could not vote.40 By the 1970s, only
about two thousand of the more than nine thousand Osage people owned
headrights and could vote and hold office.41
Grann describes how American policymakers and political commenta-
tors responded to the sudden Osage wealth. One local newspaper lamented
that Osage Indians were “so rich that something [had] to be done about it”
(p. 76). Political commentary riddled with racism mocked Osage Indians
during the 1920s (pp. 76–77). Federal elected officials and the Department of
the Interior imposed onerous financial limitations on Osage people (pp. 77–
79). Recall that the United States held the Osage mineral estate in trust for
Osage members who owned one or more headrights. And recall that in the
early part of the twentieth century, the federal government usually acted as
more of a guardian than a trustee. Grann writes that the Office of Indian Af-
32. Pp. 37–38; Standing Bear, supra note 31, at 809. Incidentally, the Kansas reservation,
known as the Osage Diminished Reserve, was where Laura Ingalls’s family squatted; Ingalls’
family was one of many squatting non-Indian families that would eventually force the Osage
from their own lands. Frances W. Kaye, Little Squatter on the Osage Diminished Reserve: Read-
ing Laura Ingalls Wilder’s Kansas Indians, 20 GREAT PLAINS Q. 123, 126–29 (2000).
33. Kaye, supra note 32, at 129.
34. Standing Bear, supra note 31, at 809.
35 . Id .
36 . Id . at 810.
37. Pp. 49–53; Standing Bear, supra note 31, at 810–11.
38. Pp. 52–53; Standing Bear, supra note 31, at 811.
39. Standing Bear, supra note 31, at 811.
40 . Id .
41 . Id .
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fairs (now the Bureau of Indian Affairs) maintained lists of “competent” and
“incompetent” Osage Indians (p. 58). The government treated Osages with
one or more white ancestors as mixed race and therefore “competent.” But
Osages with no white ancestors were “incompetent” (p. 58). The government
found white guardians, usually “prominent white citizens [of] Osage Coun-
ty” (p. 58), for “incompetent” Osages. Guardians had near-total control over
the finances of Osages deemed incompetent, even requiring Osages to get
permission to purchase toothpaste, in Grann’s telling (p. 58). Grann notes
that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent an investigator to look into
“the expenditure of large amounts of money by these Indians” and “the
wasteful and extravagant manner of the full bloods.”42 The government’s in-
spector blamed the Christian devil for the troubles of the Osage people: “The
devil was certainly in control on that day when agreements and ratifications
were made between the Osage people, the department, and Congress, and his
majesty has certainly been in high glee at the subsequent results and the
marked accomplishments.”43 Perhaps to relieve the Osage full bloods from
falling into utter depravity,44 Congress reaffirmed that “full blood” Osages
would remain legally incompetent in 1921.45 Ten years later, after almost her
entire family was murdered, the government finally declared Mollie
Burkhart legally competent (p. 229).
The murders were one thing, but parallel to the killings was the broader
problem of corrupt guardians. FBI investigators looking into the murders of
Mollie Burkhart’s family and others also learned significant details about the
abuses perpetrated on Osage people by their guardians. Guardians often
concocted complex transactions to swindle Osages, such as purchasing cars
at market value and reselling the car to their Osage wards at five times the
value of the car (p. 154). Other times, guardians just stole overtly from their
Osage wards (p. 154). Grann writes that these arrangements collectively
amounted to “an elaborate criminal operation, in which various sectors of
society were complicit” (p. 154). He adds:
The crooked guardians and administrators of Osage estates were typically
among the most prominent white citizens: businessmen and ranchers and
lawyers and politicians. So were the lawmen and prosecutors and judges
who facilitated and concealed the swindling (and, sometimes, acted as
guardians and administrators themselves) (p. 154).
42 . Osage Extension: Hearings on S . 4039 Before the S . Comm . on Indian Affairs, 66th
Cong. 83 (1920) (letter from H.S. Traylor, Inspector); pp. 78–79.
43 . Osage Extension, supra note 42, at 83; p. 79.
44 . Osage Extension, supra note 42, at 83 (“I have visited and worked in and about most
of the cities of our country, and am more or less familiar with their filthy sores and iniquitous
cesspools, yet I never wholly appreciated the story of Sodom and Gomorrah, whose sins and
vices proved their undoing and their downfall, until I visited this Indian nation.”).
45. Act of Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 120, § 3, 41 Stat. 1249, 1250 (declaring all Osage tribal mem-
bers to be citizens, and declaring “all adult Osage Indians of less than one-half Indian blood”
competent).
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“Incompetent” Osages also could marry white people who would then be-
come their financial guardians. These so-called guardians had control over
the revenue from the Osage headright interest, that unusual property right
created by federal law and policy. And sometimes Osage life partners became
their killers.
If a white person married an Osage “incompetent,” federal law allowed
the white person to inherit the headright: the individual interest in the min-
eral estate (p. 161). The way the United States implemented its duty of pro-
tection to Osage Indians was to set up a legal mechanism that uniquely en-
couraged non-Osage people to murder them and steal their property rights.
Federal agents investigating murders discovered a pattern, at least in relation
to Mollie Burkhart’s family. Anna Brown, divorced and pregnant, had be-
queathed her estate to her mother, Lizzie Q. Kyle (p. 162). Mollie’s husband,
Ernest Burkhart; his brother Bryan Burkhart; and their uncle William Hale, a
leading white citizen of Osage County, conspired to murder Anna (pp. 128–
29, 162). Lizzie supposedly had inherited eight headrights by the time of An-
na’s death,46 likely making her one of the wealthiest people in Oklahoma and
maybe the entire United States. The conspiracy then turned to Lizzie, who
died of poisoning (pp. 35–36, 162). Lizzie had bequeathed most of her estate
to her daughters Mollie and Rita (p. 162). Mollie’s sister Minnie had married
a man named Bill Smith; Minnie then died of a mysterious “wasting disease,”
with Bill inheriting her estate (pp. 63, 162). Mollie’s sister Rita then married
the same Bill Smith (p. 63). A murderer blew up their house, killing Rita and
Bill both (pp. 85–92). A quirk of their will meant that Bill’s family inherited
Rita’s estate (p. 162). Only Mollie and her children remained. And Mollie
was married to Ernest Burkhart, one of the conspirators. After federal inves-
tigators interrogated him, Ernest confessed to the conspiracy (pp. 189–91).
He later testified to the conspiracy in court during the trial of his uncle Wil-
liam Hale for the murder of another Osage headright owner, Henry Roan
(pp. 211–12). During the trial, Mollie’s daughter, Little Anna, died of a se-
vere illness (p. 209). But since the FBI was in Osage County to prosecute
murder, they did not pursue facts that might have allowed the Osages to
bring breach of trust claims against their guardians. The Department of the
Interior and the Department of Justice should have been overseeing these
guardians but did nothing.
This history shows that the federal government failed to uphold its duty
of protection to the Osage Nation and its citizens long before the murders.
First, the United States forced the Osage Nation from its homelands outside
Oklahoma to a reservation in Kansas. Then, the United States terminated the
Kansas reservation in favor of a reservation in Oklahoma on land no one
wanted. Congress next ordered the allotment of Osage Nation lands but al-
lowed the tribe, collectively, to retain its mineral estate. Bafflingly, the gov-
ernment created the headright system that undermined tribal self-
determination for decades. In the 1900s, the federal government terminated
46. FIXICO, supra note 2, at 36.
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the Osage tribal government. During this time, even after learning the Osage
mineral estate was incredibly valuable, the federal government did little or
nothing to advise or assist Osage citizens. As non–American Indians began
to abuse the legal system to place Osage allottees under state guardianship,
the federal government did nothing to stop them. Even after the Osage mur-
ders began, the federal government did little—excepting the prosecution of
Henry Roan’s murder, which incidentally was part of the same conspiracy
leading to Mollie Burkhart’s family’s murders. It took an Osage Tribal
Council request in 1923, along with payments of $20,000 to the Department
of Justice, to persuade the United States to investigate (pp. 96, 110). The fed-
eral convictions of William Hale and others for several Osage murders sug-
gest that the United States, perhaps belatedly, recognized its duty of protec-
tion. Needless to say, the Osage murders are a mission-critical failure of the
federal government’s duty of protection. Why did this happen?
In the modern era of federal American Indian law, which began in the
mid-twentieth century,47 the duty of protection is described with two key
terms of art. The first is the general trust relationship, duty, or obligation.48
The second includes enforceable trust duties or obligations.49 The general
trust relationship is a term of art the United States Supreme Court adopted
to describe the duty of protection.50 The Court usually employs the phrase to
distinguish the obligations to manage tribal or American Indian assets that
the United States has imposed on itself by statute or regulation—in other
words, an enforceable trust or fiduciary duty.51 Despite the fact that the gen-
eral trust relationship is the duty of protection, which we know is a bar-
gained-for series of rights of Indians and tribes and a series of concomitant
federal legal obligations to preserve those rights, the Supreme Court de-
scribes the general trust relationship as a mere moral obligation that is unen-
forceable in federal courts.52 That the general trust relationship is the source
47. Charles F. Wilkinson labeled the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959) as the beginning of the “modern era” of federal Indian law. CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 1 (1987).
48. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5.2, at 181.
49 . Id . § 5.2, at 194.
50. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (“Our construction of these stat-
utes and regulations is reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship
between the United States and the Indian people. This Court has previously emphasized ‘the
distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these de-
pendent and sometimes exploited people.’ This principle has long dominated the Govern-
ment’s dealings with Indians.” (citation omitted) (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)).
51 . See FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5.2, at 194.
52 . Cf . United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 165 (2011) (“In this case,
we consider whether the fiduciary exception applies to the general trust relationship between
the United States and the Indian tribes. We hold that it does not. Although the Government’s
responsibilities with respect to the management of funds belonging to Indian tribes bear some
resemblance to those of a private trustee, this analogy cannot be taken too far. The trust obliga-
tions of the United States to the Indian tribes are established and governed by statute rather
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of federal authority to enact and implement American Indian affairs statutes
but is somehow unenforceable by the trust beneficiary is one of the greatest
contradictions, and tragedies, of American law.
The federal government’s duty of protection toward the Osage Nation
and its citizens should have forced the United States to act quickly, at least
when nonindigenous people began to swindle and murder Osage people. But
under the government’s theory of the duty of protection, there was no obli-
gation at all. Instead, there is discretion, akin to prosecutorial discretion.
Nothing can force the United States to act to fulfill its duties under the gen-
eral trust relationship, though at least the government is authorized to inter-
vene when it actually chooses to do so.
The jurisprudence of the general trust relationship means that Congress
is constitutionally authorized to enact Indian affairs laws but free to disre-
gard its treaty obligations at its discretion. Of course, that is not what Indian
nations bargained for. But the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence enables this
state of affairs.
That story begins with the cases that confirmed the meaning of the duty
of protection of the United States to Indians and Indian nations. In Cherokee
Nation v . Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall tied the duty of protection to the
metaphor of guardianship, with the United States as guardian and Indian
people as wards dependent on the federal government for all basic needs.53
The facts on the ground directly contradicted Marshall’s description in that
some Indian tribes, most especially the Cherokee Nation of the early nine-
teenth century, were hardly dependent on the government, but no matter to
the Court then or now.54 The Court retreated somewhat from this character-
ization the next year in Worcester v . Georgia,55 but the jurisprudential dam-
age had been done. The rhetoric of guardianship and dependency dominated
the national political and legal discourse on Indian affairs from that point
until the 1970s, when dependency talk became mixed with self-
determination talk.56 Still, even now, the Supreme Court categorically de-
fines Indian tribes by referring to their dependent status.57 Recall that under
the doctrine of the duty of protection, dependency is a limited notion refer-
ring exclusively to the external aspects of Indian affairs.58 In internal tribal
affairs, dependency has a much different meaning and is reservation specific.
than the common law, and in fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a pri-
vate trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law.”).
53. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
54. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 509, 547–
48 (2007) (noting that Founding era leaders were preoccupied with the possibility that Ameri-
can Indian tribes could wage a devastating war on the still-weak American Republic).
55. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542–43 (1832).
56. The tribal self-determination era is usually understood to have begun in the 1970s.
FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 3.12, at 103–06.
57 . E .g ., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (“As depend-
ents, the tribes are subject to plenary control by Congress.”).
58 . See supra Part I.
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The metaphor of guardianship did not completely dominate national
Indian affairs policy until the 1880s, when the Supreme Court decided the
cases of what some refer to as the plenary power trilogy.59 The first case, Ex
parte Crow Dog, established the Court’s view that Indian people were effec-
tively subhuman as a matter of law.60 To the Court at that time, American
Indian nations were virtual nonentities. The second case, United States v .
Kagama, confirmed congressional plenary power to legislate on all aspects of
Indian reservation life and governance; it was based entirely on the Court’s
understanding that Indian people could not care for themselves, so weak and
dependent they were on the federal government.61 The third case, Lone Wolf
v . Hitchcock, drove the stake of guardianship deep into the heart of tribal
sovereignty by confirming federal power to abrogate Indian treaties at will
and adopting the guardianship model for assessing decisions of the United
States to dispose of tribal and individual Indian property interests.62 In this
trilogy, guardianship talk went from a metaphor to the law of the land.
Congress finally began to retreat from the guardianship model of Indian
affairs regulation in the 1970s and 1980s and expressly acknowledged the
general trust relationship in every major Indian affairs statute enacted since
then.63 Congress also generally waived federal government immunity to
claims by Indian tribes and individual Indians for breach of trust arising
59. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, 40
HUM. RTS., May 2015, at 3, 4.
60. 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (“It is a case where, against an express exception in the law
itself, that law, by argument and inference only, is sought to be extended over aliens and
strangers; over the members of a community separated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of
a free though savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to impose upon them the
restraints of an external and unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil
conduct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have no previous warning; which
judges them by a standard made by others and not for them, which takes no account of the
conditions which should except them from its exactions, and makes no allowance for their in-
ability to understand it. It tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor
the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social state of
which they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their histo-
ry, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which
measures the red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.” (emphases add-
ed)).
61. 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (“These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They
are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. De-
pendent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are of-
ten their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.” (emphases added)).
62. 187 U.S. 553, 564–67 (1903).
63. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04[4][a], at 420–421 (2005 ed.),
quoted in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 192–93 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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from the mismanagement of tribal and Indian assets.64 In short, congres-
sional policy has been moving toward an understanding of its duty of protec-
tion as akin to a trust obligation. Yet the United States is not all the way
there.
The Department of Justice continues to advocate zealously in favor of
the guardianship model. It sometimes argues, in order to avoid liability, that
federal government mismanagement of Indian and tribal assets should be
assessed by the judiciary under a Lone Wolf model of guardianship rather
than by a common law trust.65 More recently, federal courts have strongly
admonished and sanctioned the Department of Justice for making misrepre-
sentations of fact to the court.66 The Department of Justice also views the
general trust relationship as imposing no enforceable duties whatsoever.67 In
most cases, the Supreme Court grants the win to the government’s theory of
the duty of protection, severely diluting the ability of Indian tribes and indi-
vidual Indians to seek redress for breaches of trust.68 In the case of the gen-
eral trust relationship, the Supreme Court has all but held that there is noth-
ing enforceable. Worse for tribal interests, Justice Thomas does not
recognize a duty of protection at all and advocates for the Court to adopt his
theory that there is little or no congressional power to legislate in Indian af-
fairs.69 Again, this is not what Indian nations had in mind when they negoti-
ated in good faith with the United States during the treaty era.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP
Killers of the Flower Moon makes the argument, at least implicitly, in fa-
vor of the duty of protection. Grann’s narrative suggests that the bad guys
were those awful white men who swindled and murdered their way to en-
riching themselves with Osage wealth. Grann’s coda tells how the federal
government eventually released its files on William Hale’s conspiracy
(p. 238), but there is much more evidence in the federal archives about many
more murders (p. 283). One might take away from the book that the solution
is federal oversight of the sort that might effectively implement the ancient
duty of protection guaranteed in Indian treaties and in federal Indian law
64 . E .g ., 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012).
65. Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 16, at 431.
66 . Id . at 431 & n.209 (collecting cases).
67 . Id . at 429 (referencing a Department of Justice statement agreeing only to be “mind-
ful” of the trust relationship (quoting Attorney General Guidelines Stating Principles for
Working With Federally Recognized Indian Tribes, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,905 (Dec. 12, 2014))); id . at
433 (“[T]he Executive Branch has continued to assert that its trust duties to Indians are limited
to express statutory or regulatory mandates.”).
68 . Cf . id . at 441–46.
69 . Cf ., e .g ., Upstate Citizens for Equality v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2017)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954,
1967–69 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 657–66
(2013) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214–26 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment).
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generally. After all, it was the federal government that came to the rescue of
Mollie Burkhart and her children. But the government treats its obligations
as voluntary. Recall that the Osage tribal council had to subsidize the federal
government’s investigation (p. 110). Grann, while certainly critical of the
federal government, still lets the United States off the hook.
Indian nations and Indian people expect the federal government to ful-
fill its trust duties, even though its track record as trustee is terrifically poor.
There seems to be a deep disconnect here. The wise sage of federal Indian
law Sam Deloria, who has guided the publication of several editions of Co-
hen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law since the 1970s, loves to tell a joke
about the trust relationship. Imagine, he says, as Martin Cruz Smith did, that
the Indians won.70 All the white people have to move out of the country,
leaving the Indians as victors on their homelands. Deloria facetiously argues
that many Indians would be on the dock as the ships depart, demanding that
the United States come back and fulfill its trust duties.
There is a conflict of sorts, but it is a conflict that both the United States
and its treaty partners, Indian tribes, negotiated for when they established
the duty of protection. For Indian tribes that need assistance to govern their
lands, the federal government is obligated to act to protect those tribes and
their citizens in every reasonable way. For Indian tribes that need less assis-
tance because they are economically successful and are moving toward self-
sufficiency, the United States is there to fill the gaps that arise. For Indian
tribes that do not need anything from the federal government, the duty of
protection does not disappear. For all Indian tribes, no matter their level of
dependence or self-sufficiency, the United States retains its duty to protect
them and their citizens from outside forces, both domestic and international.
The problem, then, will always be the federal government’s political will
to understand and implement its duty of protection to Indian nations and
Indian people. The Supreme Court, with the possible exception of a decade
or two during and after the Warren Court era,71 routinely enables the federal
government to ignore or outright reject the duty of protection. Structurally,
the Court’s deference to the political decisions made by Congress and the
executive branch to regulate Indian affairs is deep and broad. Ideologically,
the judges on the Supreme Court are deeply suspicious of the Indian nations,
which they describe almost in mystical terms.
The Supreme Court’s deference to one particular federal agency—the
Department of Justice—is a particular problem for tribal interests. The De-
partment of Justice treats its obligations under the general trust relationship
as completely voluntary, effectively mere political decisions. In treaty rights
cases or when challenging a federal Indian affairs statute, the United States’
interests largely align with tribal interests. In such cases, the Department of
Justice has little choice but to align with tribal interests. At times, the federal
government voluntarily intervenes in cases to support tribal interests. Exam-
70. MARTIN CRUZ SMITH, THE INDIANS WON (1970).
71. Fletcher, supra note 59, at 4–5.
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ples include the Haudenosaunee land claims and the Washington and Mich-
igan Indian treaty rights cases.72 So far, so good.
At other times, the United States stubbornly declines to support tribal
interests or opposes tribal interests. As noted above, even during the Obama
Administration, arguably the most supportive administration of tribal inter-
ests in American history, the Department of Justice’s litigation position was
that the federal government’s interests always override the trust responsibil-
ity.73 The Department of Justice has even carved out for itself the power to
reject the positions of its clients—such as the Department of the Interior, the
department primarily charged with administering the general trust responsi-
bility.74 All too often, the federal government as trustee has a conflict of in-
terest with the tribal trust beneficiaries, and the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly excused the government from its obligations to Indians and tribes.75
Absent perhaps a constitutional amendment or a new treaty dealing
with these issues, extremely unlikely in any American political climate, the
best tribal interests can hope for is an act of Congress that dictates to the ex-
ecutive branch how to meet its trust obligations.76
CONCLUSION
Mollie Burkhart, her mother, and her sisters were victims of another
form of insidious crime—violence against American Indian women and
children. Of all the persons and entities supposedly covered by the federal
government’s duty of protection, these Indian people are the least protected.
Although the Osage murders seem like an ancient problem unlikely to
recur in modern America, the rate of violent crimes against women and
children in Indian country is bad, and worsening. American Indian women
in Indian country are subjected to sexual assaults at a rate far worse than any
other demographic.77 American Indian women suffer from human traffick-
ing, too, though we do not know the scope of that horror yet.78 American
72 . See FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 12.1, at 505–11 (Puget Sound American Indian trea-
ty rights litigation); id . § 12.2, at 511–16 (Michigan American Indian treaty rights litigation);
id . § 4.7, at 151–56 (eastern American Indian land claims).
73. Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 16, at 433.
74 . Id . at 439 (citing Venus Prince, Insights from In-House and Interior: Top 10 Lessons
from My 10 Years of Experience, FED. LAW., Apr. 2016, at 28, 31).
75 . See generally Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict
of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307 (2002); Venus Prince,
Insights from In-House and Interior: Top 10 Lessons from My 10 Years of Experience, FED. LAW.,
Apr. 2016, at 28, 31.
76. Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 16, at 448–49.
77. NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, VAWA 2013’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT 3 (2018), http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncai-publications/
SDVCJ_5_Year_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW5V-PV2W].
78. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING (INCLUDING SEX TRAFFICKING) OF
AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES (2017), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/
file/998081/download [https://perma.cc/NK3E-CNKS].
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Indian children suffer when their parents suffer, as well.79 The federal gov-
ernment did next to nothing for the Osage Nation’s citizens a century ago.
The federal government is still doing next to nothing for indigenous women
and children today.
Yes, Congress focused attention on the problem with the Tribal Law and
Order Act of 2010 (TLOA).80 Yes, Congress authorized Indian tribes to
prosecute non-Indians for dating violence and domestic violence in the Vio-
lence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA).81 But both
statutes do far too little. First, at the demand of the Alaska congressional del-
egation, Congress initially excluded Alaska from benefitting from the
VAWA authorization82 (an error it corrected later83). There are 229 federally
recognized Indian nations in Alaska.84 None of them benefit from gaming.
And due to a quirk in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, those na-
tions do not benefit much from natural resources extraction either. Alaska
Native women suffer the worst of any group of people in the United States.85
Second, more than half of the remaining Indian nations in the United States
are similarly situated to Alaska Native tribes—lacking economic resources to
do much to resolve the criminal wave against Indian women.86 Both TLOA
and VAWA require Indian tribes to guarantee criminal procedural rights
beyond those required for any criminal defendant in any other jurisdiction
in the United States.87 Most Indian tribes cannot afford to comply, even if
they wanted to.
The United States has created and still maintains a similar legal, politi-
cal, and economic environment to the one that allowed for the murder of at
least twenty-four, and perhaps hundreds, of Osage Indians (pp. 280–83)
nearly a century ago.88 It was the United States that undermined Indian trea-
79. ATTORNEY GEN.’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AM. INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN
EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE: ENDING VIOLENCE SO CHILDREN CAN THRIVE (2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/defendingchildhood/pages/attachments/2014/11/18/
finalaianreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/82SB-YFKH].
80. Pub. L. No. 111–211, §§ 201–31, 124 Stat. 2258, 2261–74 (2010) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 18, 25 U.S.C.).
81. Pub. L. No. 113–4 §§ 904–05, 127 Stat. 54, 120–24 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1304 (Supp. V 2018), 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) (Supp. V 2018)).
82 . Id . § 910; § 205, 124 Stat. at 2264.
83. Act of Dec. 18, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–275, 128 Stat. 2988 (2014) (repealing § 910,
127 Stat. at 126).
84. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER
xii (2013), https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_
America_Safer-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YUJ-WNN9].
85 . Id .
86. NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, supra note 77, at 29–30.
87. For example, only a law-trained judge may oversee the prosecution of non–
American Indians by American Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012). States do not require
judges to be law trained. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
88. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER ET AL., STATEMENT OF THE MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW INDIGENOUS LAW AND POLICY CENTER ON THE TRIBAL LAW
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ty rights and reservation boundaries with allotment and dispossession of In-
dian lands. It was the United States that undermined tribal governments,
leaving a vacuum that has not been filled by responsible governments on too
many reservations. It was the United States Supreme Court that gutted the
legal authority for tribes to prosecute non-Indians for even those tribes with
the capacity to enforce the law.89 And it is the United States that refuses to
accept legal responsibility for its ongoing breaches of the duty of protection,
also known as the general trust responsibility, to Indians and tribes.
Killers of the Flower Moon will be an eye-opener for those who are not
aware of what it means for the United States to shirk its duties to Indian
people. Osage people alive today are direct victims of the Osage Reign of
Terror (pp. 280–91). Grann’s book tells an interesting story about the early
days of the FBI, the development of early criminal investigation techniques,
and the slow death of frontier injustice and corruption. It is a story ripe for a
suspenseful and entertaining film.90 But Killers of the Flower Moon could be
so much more. For whatever reason—be it the fame of the author,91 the fo-
cus on major American historical figures like J. Edgar Hoover, or the fact
that the FBI is investigating the current president—Grann’s work has the at-
tention of much of the American public. Killers of the Flower Moon should
be a call to action for the United States to take its duty of protection serious-
ly, but instead the stories of real American Indian lives are a framing mecha-
nism for a true-crime FBI story. Indian tribes standing against the political
winds that threaten the trust relationship, the duty of protection the ances-
tors negotiated for in the nineteenth century, deserve more. The thousands
of American Indian women who suffer sexual assaults every year and the
thousands of American Indian children who witness and suffer violence eve-
ry year deserve much more.
AND ORDER ACT 1–2 (2011), https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/_files/MSU%
20ILPC%20Statement%20to%20the%20Indian%20Law%20and%20Order%20Commission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4XN-7ZAE].
89. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
90. Such a story risks yet another white savior film, see MATTHEW W. HUGHEY, THE
WHITE SAVIOR FILM: CONTENT, CRITICS, AND CONSUMPTION (2014), but that analysis is for
another time.
91. Grann is also the author of The Lost City of Z: A Tale of Deadly Obsession in the Am-
azon (2009), made into a film released in 2016 by acclaimed director James Gray.
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